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New Jersey Bail Reform: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Concerns
Jessica Guarracino*
I.

Introduction

Since 1844, New Jersey constitutionally guaranteed monetary bail to all arrested persons
not charged with a capital offense.1

During this time, case law established that the only

determination in setting monetary bail or conditions of pretrial release was to assess the arrestee’s
likelihood to appear in court.2 On November 4, 2014, the voters of New Jersey drastically changed
the bail laws in the State.3 The constitutional right to monetary bail was replaced with a
constitutional right to monetary bail, non-monetary conditions, or a combination of the both.4 The
constitutional amendment also permitted the courts to consider an arrestee’s likelihood to appear
in court, the risk the arrestee posed to the community or other person if released pretrial, and the
arrestee’s likelihood to obstruct the criminal justice process.5 Finally, the New Jersey voters gave
the legislature the power to establish applicable bail laws consistent with the amendment.6
On January 1, 2017, the New Jersey legislature’s new bail laws—the Criminal Justice
Reform Act (CJRA)—took effect.7 The major change under the CJRA was practically erasing
monetary bail as a consideration for judges in pretrial release.8 Arrestees and bail bonds companies
challenged the federal constitutional validity of the CJRA—even the former television star, Dog
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the Bounty Hunter, did so.9 The ACLU is a proponent of the CJRA and filed an amicus brief with
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in support of the State.10
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief history of bail in New Jersey. Next, Part III
will explain the present bail reform in New Jersey, the statutory language of the CJRA, and the
effect this has had on the bail bonds industry. Part IV will discuss the Eighth and Fourth
Amendments. Part V will discuss the Fourth Amendment concerns of removing monetary bail
from consideration alongside other non-monetary restrictive conditions. Specifically, part V will
analyze the reasonableness of the imposition of ankle monitors on arrestees following pretrial
release and whether a less restrictive means of implementing the CJRA’s purpose—monetary
bail—affects the constitutionality of the CJRA. In sum, this Comment will argue that the CJRA
is not unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
II.

A Brief History of Bail in New Jersey

The New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the CJRA for the first time in State v.
Robinson.11 The court recognized the similarities between the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984
(“Federal Act”) and the CJRA.12 The court also noted one striking difference: the Federal Act
places monetary bail alongside other restrictive conditions of pretrial release for a court’s

9

See Holland v. Rosen, No. 17-4317 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2017) (involving an arrestee released pretrial and subject to
restrictive conditions pursuant to the CJRA, including house arrest and ankle monitoring, and a bail bonds company
claiming the CJRA violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments). The district court stayed all
proceedings pending the plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal of the denial of preliminary injunction. Id. See also Rodgers
v. Christie, No. 17-5556 (D.N.J July 31, 2017) (involving a mother whose son was killed by an arrestee released
pretrial pursuant to the CJRA and a bail bonds company claiming the CJRA violates the Fourteenth Amendment);
Collins v. Daniel, No. 17-776 (D.N.M. Oct. 30, 2017) (involving a similar change to the New Mexico bail laws where
an arrestee was released pretrial and claimed, along with a bail bonds company, that the current New Mexico bail laws
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consideration, whereas the CJRA removes monetary bail from consideration alongside other
restrictive conditions.13 The United States Supreme Court held the Federal Act was constitutional
in United States v. Salerno.14 The Salerno Court also held that courts were permitted to detain an
arrestee pretrial based on dangerousness to the community—or, that it was not unconstitutional for
the court to consider dangerousness at a bail hearing.15
Prior to the enactment of the CJRA, New Jersey long guaranteed a right to monetary bail.16
New Jersey required by statute since 1682 that “all persons arrested shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, unless for capital offenses, where proof is evident or presumption great.”17 In 1844, New
Jersey created a constitutional guarantee of monetary bail by including nearly identical language
to the 1682 statute in the New Jersey Constitution: “All persons shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences, when the proof is evident or presumption
great.”18 This same language was included in the New Jersey Constitution of 1947.19
New Jersey previously guaranteed a constitutional right to monetary bail to all defendants
not charged with capital offenses.20 New Jersey later extended monetary bail to defendants
charged with a crime that would have been a capital offense prior to the abolition of the death
penalty in New Jersey. For example, in State v. Johnson, the defendant was indicted by a grand
jury for first-degree murder.21 The New Jersey Supreme Court held the “death penalty provision
of the New Jersey homicide statute was invalid” and the defendant’s motion for bail was granted.22
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The Johnson court referred to the constitutional right to monetary bail in New Jersey as a
“fundamental right.”23 The court held that, because the crime the defendant was charged with was
no longer considered a capital offense, the defendant was constitutionally entitled to be released
on monetary bail.24 The court, however, provided a list of considerations for determining the bail
amount.25 Based on these considerations, prior to the enactment of the CJRA, assessing an
arrestee’s danger to the community was not a concern of the New Jersey courts when determining
bail.26 When confronted with the question of an arrestee’s effect on “public order and social
welfare,” the Johnson court declined to make a determination.27 The court stated that “the primary
purpose of bail in [New Jersey] is to insure [sic] presence of the accused at trial, and that the
constitutional right to bail should not be unduly burdened.”28
Subsequently, in State v. Fann, the New Jersey Superior Court discussed the purpose and
significance of bail.29 The court stated the purpose of bail was to guarantee the defendant would
appear in court for pretrial or trial requirements.30 The purpose of bail was not to punish the
defendant or eliminate a risk of future criminal activity once the defendant was released on bail.31
Bail was significant, because it was a New Jersey constitutional right.32 The court also mentioned
three constitutional issues with the (now former) bail system in New Jersey: (1) pretrial detention

23

Id. at 248.
Id. at 252.
25
Id. at 252–53.
26
See id.
27
294 A.2d at 252. It has been argued that, because judges were given such wide discretion in setting bail, the
consideration of an arrestee’s dangerousness to the community was likely a “secretive practice” that could not be
proven. Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones, & Claire B. Brooker, The History of Bail and Pretrial Release,
PRETRIAL JUST. INST. 1, 14 (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/PJI-History%20of%20Bail%20Revised.pdf.
28
Johnson, 294 A.2d at 252.
29
571 A.2d 1023 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990).
30
Id. at 1025.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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of arrestees unable to financially afford bail effectively denies pretrial liberties; (2) a “substantial
portion” of such arrestees would not serve any time in jail if they were able to post bail, because
at trial they would not be convicted or would not be imprisoned; and (3) defendants that were
detained pretrial were two or three times more likely to be sentenced to prison following trial.33
Over a decade later, New Jersey had not corrected some of these serious issues with the
bail system. In 2013, Chief Justice Rabner created the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice (JCCJ)
to report on issues in the criminal justice system, including bail.34 To the first point of concern
voiced by the Fann court—the denial of liberties to arrestee’s detained pretrial due to a financial
inability to post bail35—the JCCJ reported that arrestees being detained pretrial, even though they
had not been convicted, was still an issue.36 This includes separation from family members, loss
of employment, inability to support their family, and a loss of freedom where arrestees are
presumed innocent.37 As to the third point of concern—arrestees detained pretrial are two or three
times more likely to be sentenced to prison after trial38—the JCCJ reported that arrestees detained
pretrial are more likely to plead guilty, be convicted, be sentenced to prison, and receive a harsher
prison sentence than arrestees released pretrial.39
New Jersey abolished the death penalty by statute in 2007.40 Following this decision, the
constitutional right to bail was available for all criminal cases.41

33

Id. at 1027. See also, State v. Korecky, 777 A.2d 927, 930 (N.J. 2001) (stating the primary purpose of bail and any
conditions is to assure a defendant appears at trial and it should not be used as a punishment or to prevent future crime
after releasing a defendant on bail).
34
REPORT OF THE J. COMM. ON CRIM. JUST. 1 (2014),
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/finalreport3202014.pdf.
35
Fann, 571 A.2d at 1027.
36
Supra note 34, at 1–2, 17.
37
Id.
38
Fann, 571 A.2d at 1027.
39
Supra note 34, at 33.
40
See State v. Fortin, 969 A.2d 1133, 1134 (N.J. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2017).
41
State v. Robinson, 160 A.3d 1, 5 (N.J. 2017).
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III.

The Present Bail Reform

On November 4, 2014, New Jersey voters amended the New Jersey Constitution to replace
the language of “[a]ll persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for
capital offences, when the proof is evident or presumption great”42 with “[a]ll persons shall, before
conviction, be eligible for pretrial release.”43 While monetary bail is not dependent on whether
the arrestee presents a risk to others or will obstruct the criminal justice process,44 the CJRA allows
for a combination of non-monetary conditions and monetary bail to assure the arrestee’s
appearance in court, protect the safety of others, and prevent obstruction of the criminal justice
process.45 This is a striking difference from prior New Jersey case law establishing bail was to
secure an arrestee’s appearance in court and could not be used to prevent a risk of future crime.46
The CJRA took effect on January 1, 2017. The statute’s purpose is
to reasonably assure an eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required,
the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, that the eligible
defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, and
that the eligible defendant will comply with all conditions of release, while
authorizing the court, upon motion of a prosecutor, to order pretrial detention of
the eligible defendant when it finds clear and convincing evidence that no
condition or combination of conditions can reasonably assure the effectuation of
these goals.47
The statute permits monetary bail only when the court determines all other conditions of release
are inadequate to assure the arrestee will appear in court.48 The CJRA applies to an arrested
“eligible defendant” (or “arrestee”)—a person arrested under a complaint-warrant rather than a

42

N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 1 ¶ 10; Official List: Public Question Results for 11/04/2014 General Election
Public Question No. 1 (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.nj.gov/state/elections/2014-results/2014-official-generalpublic-question-1.pdf.
43
N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 1 ¶ 11 (amended Nov. 4, 2014).
44
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c)(1).
45
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(2)(c).
46
See State v. Fann, 571 A.2d 1023, 1025 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990).
47
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15.
48
Id.
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complaint-summons.49 Following the arrest, the arrestee is detained while pretrial services
prepares a “risk assessment with recommendations on conditions of release.”50

The risk

assessment must be completed and presented to the court within forty-eight hours following
detention of the arrestee.51 When making a pretrial release determination, the court will take into
account the risk assessment, any other recommendations or information, and the totality of the
circumstances.52 The arrestee may be released pretrial “on personal recognizance or on the
execution of an unsecured appearance bond” if the court is reasonably assured that the arrestee
will appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and the community, and
will not obstruct the criminal justice process.53
If the court is not reasonably assured of the above criteria, the court may release the arrestee
pretrial subject to a set of restrictive conditions.54 The restrictive conditions require the arrestee
to avoid (1) committing any offense while on release; (2) contacting any alleged victim; (3)
contacting any witnesses that may testify55; and (4) any combination of non-monetary conditions
found “in paragraph (2) of this section.”56
If necessary, the court may impose additional non-monetary restrictive conditions.57 The
court orders restrictive conditions if it is necessary to reasonably assure the arrestee will appear in
court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and the community, and will not

49

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(a).
51
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-25(b).
52
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(a).
53
Id.
54
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b).
55
It is understandable why a court would prevent an arrestee from speaking with witnesses before trial. This provision,
however, may create a barrier for arrestees that are gathering important evidence for their case. Especially for pro se
litigants who would not have the ability to speak with witnesses before trial.
56
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(1).
57
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2).
50
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obstruct the criminal justice process.58 The court must use the least restrictive condition(s).59 The
restrictive conditions include: (1) “remain in the custody of a designated person”; (2) seek or
maintain education or employment; (3) adhere to travel or living restrictions; (4) report regularly
to an agency or program; (5) adhere to a curfew; (6) not possess a weapon; (7) not use alcohol or
unlawful drugs; (8) participate in treatment programs; (9) return to custody under certain
conditions; (10) participate in home supervision; (11) wear an ankle monitor, which the arrestee
may be required to pay for if the court determines they are financially able; and (12) any other
condition the court deems necessary to satisfy the CJRA’s purpose.60
After the court considers the above non-monetary restrictive conditions, if the court is not
reasonably assured the conditions would satisfy the CJRA’s purpose, the court may order the
arrestee post monetary bail only to reasonably assure the arrestee will appear in court, and not to
protect the safety of people or the community, or to prevent obstruction of the criminal justice
process.61 In the event the court finds pretrial release under the above criteria is insufficient, the
court may order the arrestee be released subject to a combination of the non-monetary restrictions
and monetary bail or be detained pretrial.62
The CJRA is notably different from the prior manner of enforcing bail for pretrial release.
Monetary bail was formerly a constitutional and fundamental right in New Jersey. 63 The New

58

Id.
Id.
60
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2).
61
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c)(1)
The court may only impose monetary bail pursuant to this subsection to reasonably assure the
eligible defendant's appearance. The court shall not impose the monetary bail to reasonably assure
the protection of the safety of any other person or the community or that the eligible defendant will
not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process, or for the purpose of preventing the
release of the eligible defendant.
62
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c)(1), (d)(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-18(a)(1).
63
State v. Johnson, 294 A.2d 245, 248 (N.J. 1972).
59
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Jersey Supreme Court consistently rejected dangerousness in its consideration of an arrestee’s
pretrial release, stating that bail was meant to assure the arrestee’s appearance at trial.64 “Money
bail may not be used to protect the community by preventing release.”65 Following the enactment
of the CJRA, monetary bail became an afterthought, imposed only after all other non-monetary
restrictive conditions were found to be insufficient by the court.66 The arrestee’s appearance in
court remains a consideration under the CJRA, but dangerousness and obstruction to the criminal
justice process are also included.67
A.

The Effect on the Bail Bonds Industry
When an arrestee is released on monetary bail and is unable to pay, the arrestee will

generally seek a bail bonds company to post the bail.68 The bail bonds company usually charges
a ten-percent fee, which the company retains following the arrestee’s appearance in court
irrespective of the outcome.69 Some say the bail bonds industry is facing extinction due to the
CJRA.70 One previously successful company claimed it had not issued any bail bonds in 2017.71
This concern has led to two cases that are currently before the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey.72 These cases are challenging the constitutionality of the CJRA.73 Both

64

Id. at 252. See State v. Korecky, 777 A.2d 927, 934 (2001) (holding that bail is not meant to punish or to prevent an
arrestee from committing future crimes).
65
State v. Steele, 61 A.3d 174, 181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
66
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c)(1).
67
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17.
68
Joel Rose, In New Jersey, Sweeping Reforms Deliver Existential Threat to Bail Bonds Industry (July 6, 2017, 4:31
PM) NPR, http://www.npr.org/2017/07/06/535823170/in-new-jersey-sweeping-reforms-deliver-existential-threat-tobail-bonds-industry.
69
Nicholas Pugliese, Bail Bond Industry Mounts Another Attack on N.J. Reforms (Aug. 7, 2017, 11:09 AM)
NORTHJERSEY.COM,
http://www.northjersey.com/story/news/new-jersey/2017/08/07/bail-bond-industry-mountsanother-attack-n-j-reforms/539366001/.
70
John Schuppe, Post Bail (Aug. 22, 2017) NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/bail-reform.
71
Schuppe, supra note 70.
72
See Holland v. Rosen, No. 17-4317 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2017); Rodgers v. Christie, No. 17-5556 (D.N.J July 31, 2017).
73
See id.
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cases have bail bonds companies as named plaintiffs.74 In response to challenges faced by the bail
bonds industry, former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie stated that “the bail bond industry
makes a lot of money off poor people,” and referred to this practice as “disgraceful . . . [because]
you should not have to stay in jail for being poor.”75 The major changes to the bail system are
what have sparked the constitutional debate over the CJRA.
B.

Concerns and Successes of the CJRA
One of the major concerns that led to New Jersey’s bail reform was the number of arrestees

that remained in jail pretrial solely because they could not afford bail to be released.76 Since the
enactment of the CJRA, this concern has begun to change. A study conducted by the Pretrial
Justice Institute in Maryland reviewed New Jersey’s pretrial detention and granted New Jersey—
and only New Jersey—an “A” grading.77 The national average grade was a “D.”78 The available
statistics show that bail reform in New Jersey has been effective to remedy the pretrial detention
issue, but the CJRA authorized for the first time, pure pretrial detention.79 The CJRA took effect
on January 1, 2017.80 As of December 31, 2015, 8,899 arrestees were detained pretrial.81 This
number has decreased to 5,718 as of December 31, 2017—a decrease of 35.7%.82 Furthermore,

74

See id.
Pugliese, supra note 69.
76
Chief Justice Stuart Rabner of the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated the former bail system was unfair to poor
defendants, because they were unable to post bail and therefore separated from their families, fired from their jobs,
pressured into accepting plea deals, or serving a longer prison sentence compared to those defendants that were able
to post bail. Criminal Justice Reform Information Center, N.J. CTS,
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/criminal/reform.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2017).
77
Rebecca Everett, Here’s How N.J. Scores on Bail Reform (Hint: It’s Better Than Other States), NJ.COM (Nov. 1,
2017, 4:15 PM),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2017/11/nj_only_state_to_get_a_grade_from_national_bail_re.html.
78
Akira Suwa, N.J. Bail Reform Gets Top Grade from Advocate, THE INQUIRER (Oct. 31, 2017, 5:41 PM),
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/n-j-bail-reform-gets-top-grade-from-advocates-20171101.html.
79
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-18.
80
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15.
81
New Jersey Courts, Criminal Justice Reform Report, Chart C,
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/criminal/cjrreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2018).
82
Id.
75
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in 2017, as of December 31, 2017, the number of arrestees detained pretrial dropped from 7,173
to 5,718—a decrease of 20.3%.83
In addition to concerns over the jail population being flooded with arrestees unable to
afford bail, the CJRA has created debates over the future of monetary bail in New Jersey and the
country. There are serious concerns over the bail bonds industry and its ability to survive,
considering only thirty-three arrestees were released with monetary bail in the first nine months
following enforcement of the CJRA.84 Additionally, there are concerns that the CJRA violates an
arrestee’s Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This is because the CJRA removes
monetary bail from the court’s consideration at the pretrial release hearing of which restrictive
conditions the arrestee may be subject to—such as maintaining employment, obeying a curfew,
being placed on house arrest, or wearing an ankle monitor.85
IV.

Constitutional Amendments that Govern the Validity of Bail Reform Acts

Historically, pretrial release was tied to money.86 After 1776, most states adopted a law
guaranteeing bail in all but capital cases that was modelled after a Pennsylvania law.87 In 1789,
following this state law trend, federal law guaranteed bail in all but capital cases pursuant to section
33 of the Judiciary Act.88 The federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 was the “first major reform of the
federal bail system since the Judiciary Act of 1789.”89 The Bail Reform Act of 1966 provided that
any person not charged with a capital offense was entitled to be released on his or her own
recognizance or an unsecured bond, unless such a release would not reasonably assure the

83

Id. (showing a decrease in 2016 from 8,907 to 7,058—a decrease of 20.8%).
Suwa, supra note 78.
85
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b).
86
See Schnacke, supra note 27, at 4–12.
87
Id. at 4–5.
88
Id. at 5.
89
Id. at 12.
84
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arrestee’s appearance at trial.90 Additionally, if it was determined the release would not reasonably
assure appearance at trial, monetary bail and other conditions may be required, including travel
restrictions or placing the arrestee under another’s supervision.91 Further bail reform occurred in
1984 via the Federal Act.92 Only recently, however, has New Jersey overhauled its bail laws to
become broader and include non-monetary restrictive conditions placed on an arrestee pretrial in
lieu of monetary bail.93 In New Jersey, pretrial release is no longer tied to money.
A.

A Brief Discussion of the Eighth Amendment and Bail Reform
The Eighth Amendment94 is relevant to bail, and the CJRA is similar to the Federal Act,

which the Court held was constitutional.95 Salerno changed the federal application of the Eighth
Amendment to include consideration of dangerousness when issuing bail.96
Salerno stated the Eighth Amendment mentions “nothing about whether bail shall be
available at all.”97 The courts may deny bail if the arrestee will threaten the judicial process.98
The plaintiff argued his bail was determined based solely on whether he would appear in court.99
The Court, however, found that “[n]othing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible
Government considerations solely to questions of flight.”100

90

The Court found the Eighth

18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966).
Id.
92
18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–56 (1984).
93
Compare N.J. CONST. OF 1947, art. 1 ¶ 10 (“All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offences, when the proof is evident or presumption great.”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15
(West 2017) (“Monetary bail may be set for an eligible defendant only when it is determined that no other conditions
of release will reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required.”).
94
The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed.” U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
95
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; 18 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
96
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
97
Id. at 752.
98
Id. at 753.
99
Id. at 752–53.
100
Id. at 754.
91
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Amendment did not limit a bail determination to flight and Congress could include other
compelling interests.101
The Federal Act permits a federal judge to order an arrestee to be detained pretrial if there
is clear and convincing evidence no conditions of release will reasonably assure a person’s or
community’s safety.102 This is similar to the CJRA’s purpose, which is to reasonably assure the
arrestee will appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and the
community, will not obstruct the criminal justice process, and will follow the release conditions.103
Additionally, because the CJRA104 mirrors the Federal Act,105 a judge may consider an arrestee’s
dangerousness to the community when imposing pretrial release conditions under the CJRA
without violating the constitution. One main difference between the CJRA and the Federal Act is
that the Federal Act permits the court to consider monetary bail alongside non-monetary
restrictions, and the CJRA requires the court consider the non-monetary restrictions only before.106
B.

A Brief Discussion of the Fourth Amendment and Bail Reform
1.

Supreme Court Precedent: Searches and the Advancement of Technology

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in part: “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.”107 This country has changed immensely since the enactment of

101

Id. at 754–55.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B).
103
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15.
104
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15(b)(1) (“If the court does not find, after consideration, that the release . . . will
reasonably assure . . . the protection of the safety of any other person or the community, . . . the court may order the
pretrial release of the eligible defendant subject to [certain conditions].”)
105
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (“If the judicial officer determines that the release . . . will endanger the safety of any other
person or the community, such judicial officer shall order the pretrial release of the person [will be subject to certain
conditions].”)
106
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2), (c).
107
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
102
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the Fourth Amendment. New technological advancements present new questions for the Court to
decide on whether the use of particular technology is a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Most relevant to the within discussion is the Court’s recent decision in Grady v. North
Carolina, where the Court found the requirement to wear an ankle monitor on an individual
released from prison after expiration of his sentence was a search under the Fourth Amendment.108
Grady was not the Court’s first analysis of evolving technologies, and the Court is still deciding
what kinds of technology the Fourth Amendment extends to.109 The doctrine applied today is
based on the Court’s previous considerations of new technology and how it may (or may not) be
used in compliance with the Fourth Amendment.
In 1967, the Court in Katz v. United States held that the installation of an electronic
listening device outside of a public telephone booth in order to listen to conversations was a search
under the Fourth Amendment.110 The Court found that, even though Katz had made phone calls
in a public phone booth, he intended for the conversations to be private.111 The Court stated that
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.”112 Furthermore, the Court overruled Olmstead v. United
States,113 which held that a Fourth Amendment inquiry required physical penetration of a place
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and the seizure of tangible property.114 The Katz Court concluded by stating that “[w]herever a
man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.”115 Katz is an early example of where the Court restricted the government’s use of
monitoring devices on a person who had not been found guilty of a crime.
In addition to listening devices, the Court has considered whether using and monitoring a
tracking device is a search under the Fourth Amendment.116 In United States v. Karo, law
enforcement agents placed a beeper inside a container of ether—purchased by private citizens (the
respondents) from a government informant—to track its location.117 The agents used the beeper
to track the ether to multiple locations, including Karo’s house, two storage facilities, and three
other parties’ houses.118 The agents did not obtain a warrant until after tracking the ether to all of
these locations.119 The Court stated that the installation of the beeper was not a search under the
Fourth Amendment, but monitoring the beeper was.120 The Court compared warrantless tracking
of the beeper while inside the private residences to an agent entering the residence without a
warrant to verify the ether was inside.121 The beeper was tracked while inside private residences,
“which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by
a warrant.”122 This expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”123
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While the Court had not considered ankle monitoring prior to Karo, monitoring the beeper may be
compared to monitoring an arrestee’s location when wearing an ankle monitor.
In 2001, the Court continued to address the question of “what limits there are upon
[the] power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”124 In Kyllo v. United States,
law enforcement agents believed that Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home.125 To confirm
this suspicion, the agents—while parked outside of Kyllo’s house and without a warrant—used a
thermal imager machine to detect high-intensity heat lamps that are often used to grow
marijuana.126 Based on the thermal imager results, the agents believed Kyllo was using heat lamps
and obtained a warrant to search his residence, where the agents confirmed that Kyllo was growing
marijuana.127 The Court compared the use of the thermal imager machine to the electronic
listening device used in Katz.128 In both Katz and Kyllo, neither device physically infiltrated the
area that the defendant reasonably expected to be private, but both cases involved the use of
technology that allowed law enforcement agents to obtain information from within a private area
that could not be obtained from observation.129 The Court held that the use of the thermal imager
machine was a search under the Fourth Amendment.130

This case concerned how far the

government may intrude into a person’s activities while at home by using technology.
Another case from 2001, United States v. Knights, does not involve the use of technology
to conduct a search.131 Knights, however, is relevant to the issue of whether an ankle monitor is a
search under the Fourth Amendment. Knights applied the Fourth Amendment balancing test for
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searches to a court order signed by the defendant when addressing whether the defendant consented
to the search.132 The court order included certain search conditions of the defendant’s probation
and allowed him to avoid prison time.133 For Knights to be released on probation—rather than
remain in prison—he signed a court order stating his “person, property, place of residence, vehicle,
[and] personal effects [were subject] to search at anytime” by a law enforcement or probation
officer, even without a warrant of arrest, search warrant, or reasonable cause.134 After a detective
searched Knights’s apartment pursuant to the court order, the detective found evidence sufficient
to indict Knights on multiple criminal charges.135 The Court declined to decide whether Knights’s
signing of the order was a consent to the search, because the Court concluded the search was
reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.136
The Knights court stated that when determining reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment, the court must balance “on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.”137 The Court looked at Knights’s probation status and that the
sentencing judge found it necessary to condition his probation on the search provision.138 The
Court reasoned that the government had an interest to encourage rehabilitation and “protect[]
society from future criminal violations.”139 As to Knights’s privacy interest, the Court determined
that the probation order unambiguously stated the terms of the search provision and his reasonable
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expectation of privacy was significantly diminished.140 The Court held that “the warrantless search
of Knights, supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation, was
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”141
In 2012, the Court decided a GPS tracking issue in United States v. Jones.142 The FBI was
investigating Jones and obtained a warrant to attach a GPS tracking device on Jones’s wife’s car.143
The FBI did not follow the warrant when installing the GPS tracking device.144 The Government
used the GPS information to charge Jones with conspiracy and Jones was found guilty at trial.145
The Court acknowledged that a visual observation of the vehicle would not have been a search,
and a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when travelling on public roads.146
The Court, however, found that a vehicle is an effect under the Fourth Amendment.147 The Court
distinguished the use of the GPS tracking device from a visual search of the vehicle, because the
Government attached the device to a protected area.148 The Court held that GPS tracking of a
vehicle is a Fourth Amendment search, because “[t]he Government physically occupied private
property for the purpose of obtaining information.”149 The GPS tracking of the car in Jones and
the restrictions the Court placed on doing so provide guidance when determining whether tracking
an ankle monitor is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
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Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones criticized the majority’s focus on historical Fourth
Amendment principle’s, and the application of those principles to modern technology.150 Justice
Alito stated, “[I]t is almost impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous
to . . . this case.”151 An individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her daily activities
may change as more electronic monitoring devices become available.152 Justice Alito suggested
that Congress should address this evolution,153 but his concurrence illuminates the ongoing
difficulty the Court experiences in deciding whether the government’s use of new technology is a
search under the Fourth Amendment, and whether such a search is unreasonable.
In 2014, the Court determined “whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.” 154 Riley v.
California involved two cases of cell phone use by police.155 In the first case, Riley was stopped
by police and his car was impounded.156 Riley was arrested and a smart phone was recovered from
his pants pocket.157 Police searched the phone for evidence of gang affiliation without a warrant.158
Police found a photograph in the phone depicting Riley standing in front of a car that matched a
car involved in a shooting a few weeks prior; police charged Riley with that shooting.159
In the second case, Wurie was arrested after police witnessed him participating in a drug
sale.160 A flip phone was recovered from Wurie.161 While the phone was in the police’s
150

See id. at 419.
Id. at 420 (“Is it possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted himself somewhere in a coach and
remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements of the coach’s owner?”).
152
Id. at 429.
153
Id.
154
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014).
155
Id. at 2480.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 2480–81.
159
Id. at 2481.
160
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481.
161
Id.
151

19

possession, multiple calls were received from “my house.”162 Without a warrant, police opened
the phone, pressed two buttons to obtain the phone number and searched online to find where the
calls originated.163 When the police arrived at the location of the calls, they obtained a search
warrant, searched the home, and seized drugs, a gun, and cash.164 Wurie was then charged.165
The Court stated that a search of the cell phone data could not be justified as a search
incident to arrest because the arrestee cannot use the cell phone data as a weapon to endanger an
officer or as a tool to escape.166 The Court was concerned with the amount of personal information
that an officer could access on a cell phone without a warrant, including GPS information.167 GPS
information can provide specific movements of an individual, and “‘a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”168 The Court held that a
warrant is required to search cell phone data seized incident to an arrest.169 This case demonstrates
how invasive GPS data can be, which applies to ankle monitoring.
Finally, most important to the within analysis, the Court created a necessary connection
between the Fourth Amendment and the imposition of an ankle monitor as a condition of pretrial
release.170 In Grady v. North Carolina, Grady was convicted of a crime, sentenced, and released
upon completion of his prison term.171 Pursuant to a North Carolina statute, the court determined
that Grady should be released with the condition that he wear an ankle monitor for the rest of his
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life.172 Grady appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the requirement, because it violated
his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.173 The Court concluded
that “a State . . . conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent,
for the purpose of tracking that individual’s movements.”174 The Court, however, left unanswered
the question of whether such a search was unreasonable.175
2.

The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness and the Least Restrictive Means

Some may say that requiring an arrestee to wear an ankle monitor is more restrictive than
the option of release on monetary bail.176 Others argue that wearing an ankle monitor is less
restrictive when compared with pretrial detention due to an arrestee’s inability to post bail. 177
While the least restrictive means are not required for a search to be reasonable, 178 the court must
balance an individual’s privacy interest against the government’s interest.179
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.180 The Court
determines whether a search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.181 The reasonableness
of a search “is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
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legitimate governmental interests.”182 The present matter involves arrestees that are released
pretrial with restrictive conditions. The Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis is different
under the CJRA than for parties that are searched incident to an arrest or matters where law
enforcement agents must obtain a warrant prior to a search. Rather, the State and the courts are
making a determination of which restriction(s) the arrestee will be subject to. The present matter
is similar to parties sentenced to probation or released on parole and subject to restrictive
conditions. Here, however, “unlike convicts, arrestees and pretrial detainees,” the arrestees “are
entitled to a presumption of innocence.”183 Furthermore, being arrested for a crime does not create
an inference that the arrestee is more likely to commit a crime if released pretrial.184
When a court in the State of New Jersey orders an arrestee wear an ankle monitor as a
condition of pretrial release, this creates a search under the Fourth Amendment.185 Though not
required, when determining which restrictive conditions to place upon an arrestee under the CJRA,
the court must order “the least restrictive condition, or combination of conditions” to reasonably
assure the arrestee will appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and
the community, and will not obstruct the criminal justice process.186 Monetary bail is not included
in this consideration.187 The Supreme Court has “repeatedly refused” to state that only the least
restrictive search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.188
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For example, in Illinois v. Lafayette, the Court determined whether the police may search
an arrestee’s shoulder bag upon arriving at the police station without a warrant.189 The Court found
that the search was reasonable in order to protect the police officers and to inventory the contents
of the shoulder bag.190 Other, less restrictive, means of effecting these goals would have been to
seal the shoulder bag in a plastic bag.191 The Court, however, rejected this argument, because
reasonableness is not determined based on the existence of a less restrictive alternative. 192 The
Court declined to second-guess police departments on the methods used to “best deter theft by and
false claims against its employees” and protect the security of the police station.193
The Court also considered the least restrictive means in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n.194 The Court decided whether regulations imposed by the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) requiring drug and alcohol tests of certain employees was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.195 The Court considered the respondents’ argument that “less drastic and
equally effective means” existed where drug and alcohol tests were not necessary, such as training
supervisors to detect employees that may be under the influence. 196 The Court rejected this
argument and stated that reasonableness is not determined based on the existence of a less
restrictive alternative.197 The Court noted that the FRA did consider various alternatives and
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reasonably found them inadequate.198

The Court declined to “second-guess the reasonable

conclusions drawn by the FRA after years of investigation and study.”199
V.
A.

Unreasonable Search Determination Following Grady v. North Carolina

An Ankle Monitor Required Under the CJRA Is a Search Under the Fourth Amendment
The Court made two determinations in Grady: (1) ankle monitoring that is not consented

to is a Fourth Amendment search200 and (2) if the ankle monitoring is found to be a search, the
search must not be unreasonable.201 First, although the Grady Court found the ankle monitoring
was a search, the Court did not explain what “without consent” meant.202 Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court has previously declined to decide whether an individual waives his Fourth
Amendment rights by consenting to a search where the alternative is remaining in jail. 203 Some
courts of appeals, however, have found that an individual does not consent to a search where the
alternative is jail.204 A similar conclusion can be reached when an arrestee is ordered to wear an
ankle monitor as a condition of pre-trial release. If an arrestee refused to consent to a court’s order
to wear an ankle monitor, the arrestee would likely remain in jail pending trial. Nevertheless, this
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uncertainty is beyond the scope of this Comment. The Court has found it unnecessary to address
the issue of whether the defendant consented to the search when the search is reasonable.205
B.

An Ankle Monitor Required Under the CJRA Is Reasonable
To the Grady Court’s second point, because there is no consent, the imposition of an ankle

monitor is a search and the reasonableness test applies.206 The Fourth amendment protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.207 The reasonableness of a search “is determined by assessing,
on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”208
1.

The Arrestee Has Privacy Interests Against the Imposition of an Ankle Monitor

The ankle monitor imposed by the court under the CJRA creates a privacy concern for the
arrestee. It is important to remember that an arrestee released pretrial has not been found guilty of
the crime he or she is accused of. It is a fundamental principle that an individual is innocent until
proven guilty.209 Ankle monitoring is a restriction on a potentially innocent individual’s liberty.
The Supreme Court has stated that GPS information can provide specific movements of an
individual, and “reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”210 All of this formerly private information is now within control of the
government. Furthermore, certain clothing styles may make it difficult to cover up an ankle
monitor, leaving the monitor exposed for family, friends, colleagues, and others to see when the
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arrestee is in public.211 If others witness the arrestee walking down the street wearing an ankle
monitor, it may be assumed that the arrestee was already found guilty and released on probation
or parole.212 Even though the arrestee is innocent until proven guilty—or even just innocent—the
ankle monitor becomes a social stigma.213
2.

The State of New Jersey Has a Legitimate Governmental Interest Which Outweighs
the Arrestee’s Privacy Interest

The New Jersey government’s stated purpose under the CJRA is to reasonably assure that
the arrestee will appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and protection of people and the
community, will not obstruct the criminal justice process, and will follow the conditions of
release.214 As mentioned earlier, the CJRA’s purpose is similar to that of the Federal Act, which
was found to be constitutional in United States v. Salerno.215 The State’s concerns are legitimate.
To reasonably ensure the arrestee will appear in court has long been recognized as a constitutional
purpose for imposing bail.216

Additionally, the CJRA seeks to protect individuals and

communities.217 “States and municipalities are . . . vested with the [important] responsibility of
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.”218
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Furthermore, the Court has also stated that the states’ traditional police power “is defined
as the authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals.”219 The Court has recognized
this police power as a legitimate governmental interest. The CJRA certainly helps to accomplish
this interest. Specifically, if the court finds it necessary to impose a non-monetary restrictive
condition on the arrestee following pretrial release, the condition must be the least restrictive.220
The court would need to find many other less restrictive conditions were insufficient to order an
ankle monitor be worn at release. The imposition of an ankle monitor may allow the government
to prevent the arrestee from committing a future crime, leaving the state, or attacking the victim of
the arrestee’s crime if there was one.221
The government has a strong interest in protecting its citizens and the stated purpose of the
CJRA is a legitimate governmental interest. Furthermore, although the requirement that an
arrestee wear an ankle monitor may raise privacy concerns, these concerns “seem, to some extent,
intuitively reasonable.”222 The community should be protected, however, “[i]f evidence suggests
that individuals could jeopardize the safety of their community while they awaited trial.”223 Prior
to the enactment of the CJRA, some monetary bail amount would have been sufficient for an
arrestee to be released pretrial.224 Under the CJRA, however, it is reasonable to order an arrestee
to comply with conditions of pretrial release, including wearing an ankle monitor, before ordering
monetary bail, even if an arrestee is willing to pay any amount of monetary bail in lieu of the
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restrictions.225 While complying with a court’s order of pretrial release may be more burdensome
on the arrestee than simply posting bail, it is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to remove
monetary bail from the consideration. This is because the least restrictive means are not required
under the Fourth Amendment.
C.

Least Restrictive Means Are Not Required Under the Fourth Amendment
Although the CJRA states that a court is required to impose the least restrictive means from

a list of non-monetary restrictions, this was a determination of the New Jersey legislature and not
a Fourth Amendment requirement. The test under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.226
Where the search via an ankle monitor is reasonable, it is not constitutionally necessary for the
search to be the least restrictive.227 The argument can be made that monetary bail is less restrictive
than an ankle monitor, and therefore should be considered prior to the court order of an ankle
monitor. Others argue that wearing an ankle monitor is less restrictive than pretrial detention
where an arrestee is financially unable to post bail.228 Even where an arrestee considers monetary
bail less restrictive, this is not the constitutional test. The imposition of an ankle monitor is an
acceptable search when found reasonable and the existence of less restrictive monetary bail does
not make the ankle monitor any less reasonable.
It is unlikely the court will order an arrestee to wear an ankle monitor pending trial. The
percentage of parolees released with an ankle monitor can help determine how often judges are
willing to impose such a restriction. In 2013, less than 4% of parolees were required to comply
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with an ankle monitor order as a condition of their release.229 This percentage was the same in
2014 and slightly above 3% in 2015. The percentage of parolees released on “General Parole
Supervision” was approximately 50% in 2013, 2014, and 2015.230
As mentioned earlier, pursuant to the CJRA a court is required to impose the least
restrictive means from a list of non-monetary restrictions.231 These restrictions range from
maintaining employment or education, and complying with a curfew, to home supervision,
wearing an ankle monitor, or any other condition the court finds necessary.232 While the statute
does not specify that the list be followed in order, a review of the options indicates that the list is
ordered from less restrictive to more restrictive.
Now, consider what the monetary bail equivalent would be for each restriction. It is likely
that a lesser amount of bail would be ordered for an individual released with only the requirement
to remain in school than an individual required to wear an ankle monitor. While the amount of
bail equivalent to ankle monitoring is uncertain, it is likely a high amount due to the liberty
restrictions and the infrequency that such a restriction is imposed. This comparison of monetary
bail and ankle monitoring relates to the previously discussed benefit of the CJRA, that arrestees
are less likely to be detained pretrial solely because of an inability to afford monetary bail.233
Rather than ordering an individual to pay some exorbitant amount of bail that he or she cannot
afford and therefore remain in confinement, an individual may now be released with an ankle
monitor pending trial. It may also be the case that no amount of monetary bail would be sufficient
if an individual is ordered to submit to the invasiveness of an ankle monitoring.
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VI.

Conclusion

It is undeniable that it is a burden for an arrestee to wear an ankle monitor. The liberty of
the arrestee is restricted, and the arrestee may be uncomfortable and embarrassed. But, the State’s
interest in reasonably assuring the arrestee will appear in court, is not a danger to the safety and
protection of people and the community, will not obstruct the criminal justice process, and will
follow the conditions of release, would be found constitutional following United States v.
Salerno.234 Furthermore, as discussed above, an arrestee that is required to wear an ankle monitor
would likely have remained in jail pending trial under the previous bail system, because the
arrestee would be unable to post the large amount of monetary bail required, or no monetary bail
amount would have been sufficient to release the individual. Moreover, the arrestee’s liberty
interest is less restricted while wearing an ankle monitor when the alternative is confinement.
Therefore, the search created by the ankle monitor is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, the exclusion of monetary bail alongside non-monetary restrictive conditions under the
CJRA is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
New Jersey’s bail reform was a drastic change from the longstanding history of bail in the
State, which led to opposition. There are other constitutional challenges that may be raised
concerning the CJRA under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. The CJRA, however, should
not be found unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. The removal of monetary bail from
the consideration is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
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